AES-256-GCM encryption client-side, with a key the platform never sees. Stored on Hetzner S3 (EU). Ransomware-gate refuses to accept high-entropy uploads. Zero-knowledge restore.
The key is generated on your agent and never leaves your infrastructure. We hold ciphertext and cannot decrypt it — which also means we cannot leak it.
It overwrites your last good copy with encrypted rubbish. The entropy gate refuses to upload a backup that looks encrypted by someone else.
The agent talks to object storage directly with presigned URLs. Your data never passes through our API, and a 200 GB upload is not our bandwidth problem.
AES-256-GCM client-side. The key is derived on your server and never leaves it, so we hold ciphertext and nothing else.
A backup whose entropy suddenly looks like encrypted noise is refused — that is the ransomware copy overwriting your good one.
Multipart straight to object storage via presigned URLs. The data does not route through us.
Download, verify the SHA-256, decrypt on the agent, write to the target path — in that sequence, so a corrupt copy fails before it overwrites anything.
Off-site Backups from Starter; larger storage tiers on Pro / Enterprise.